The paper focuses on the process of adoption and establishment of the principle of irremovability from the Liberation from the Ottoman rule to the mid-40s of the 20th century. It is rationalized with the conclusion that it is a long and difficult process accompanied by unexpected turns and obstacles whose course and result depended solely on the political will and goals of the governing political parties.
The policy of the separate parties and governments is researched in respect to the legislative framework of the irremovability of judges and prosecutors.
The essence of the pattern of conditional, partial and phased irremovability established in the country is revealed. The opinion that the main reason for choosing this model is the lack of constitutional framework of the judicial system and, in particular, the principle of irremovability, is justified.
Finally, the author comes to the conclusion that the leading motive in the behaviour and the legislative activities of the political parties in the regulation of irremovability of judges and prosecutors is the political expediency. It is related to their willingness to impact and control the activity of the independent judiciary.